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ABSTRACT: Some exchanges of reasons are agonistic. Others work mutually, as in planning and adjusting
divergent understanding. Mutual argumentation subconsciously yields judgment that integrates and clarifies
a common vision coordinating interrelated lives. It harmonizes agents sharing a space of action and
understanding. Pierre Bourdieu held that such thought generates and expresses culture, patterning a logic
that reflexively constrains itself. This discussion examines Bourdieu’s views as an analysis of mutual
argumentation.
KEYWORDS: agonistic argumentation, attention, Bourdieu, context, cultural change, habitus, judgment,
metacognitive frame, mutualistic argumentation, re-integration of thought.

1. INTRODUCTION
Argumentation is a matter of offering for consideration reasons for acting or thinking in
one way as opposed to others on some matter of interest. Argumentation aims at
interaction, though it can proceed in soliloquy. This discussion concerns the character and
dynamics of one form of argumentation.
Some argumentation is agonistic. And this might involve many voices. Still the
purpose for each always is to establish some position or point as the correct one. Other
exchanges of reasons work mutually, serving shared objectives. These ends are
cooperative or collaborative. Joint planning, mutual adjustments of a common
understanding or of a common set of rules or set of agreements, of relations or of patterns
of interaction, all might serve multiple stakeholders in the face of changing
circumstances. Argumentation of this second form is mutualistic.
Mutualistic argumentation (MA) can give rise to a common vision of worthwhile
potentialities that might unfold from present circumstances, past agendas and new
commitments. MA seeks to reinforce or to disturb present or predominant understandings
of the way things are or are expected to be. It seeks to engage others so as to stimulate a
review or even a transformation of present assumptions, policies, or practices. The
disturbance it provides is expressed so as to suggest, explicate, endorse or otherwise bring
to attention a new sense of things, of what to do, of how to think of things. As such MA
provides a stimulus for those engaged in the argumentation to clarify, re-integrate,
articulate and internalize a common vision of the past and pending courses of one’s life.
Blatz, C. V. (2009). Culture, Judgment, Integration of Attention and Argument. In: J. Ritola (Ed.),
Argument Cultures: Proceedings of OSSA 09, CD-ROM (pp. 1-14), Windsor, ON:
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Two points call for emphasis. Any common vision arising in MA does not come out of
the provision of evidentiary support salient among a group of persons. MA does not seek
to establish the truth or correctness of some claim or its adoption as true or correct. And,
in addition, MA does not simply lead those engaged to an awareness or consideration of
the proffered view with no personal acceptance and adjustment to this view. MA orders
and in doing so harmonizes the patterns of generalized and implicit attention in those
engaged in intelligent behavior. The impact of such argumentation is (usually
subconscious) understanding expressing a shared but personal sense of the situations
within the scope of particular interests and agency. Mutualistic argumentation then is
practical thinking that (usually subconsciously) generates and informs shared viewpoints
and patterns of attention that not only orients agents in common ways, but enables them
to engage in concerted focused activity. In this regard it resembles culture. (As C.P. Snow
put it in The Two Cultures and A Second Look, speaking of those practicing physics:
“Without thinking about it, they respond alike. That is what a culture means.” Snow
1964, p. 10.) Thus, for example, MA is what provides the background attentiveness,
sensitivities, sense of direction and relevance that enables conversation. The annoying fly
is kept at bay, the parties remain engaged, “on the same page,” and the proposal goes
forward.
Arguably, Pierre Bourdieu understood the generation and expression of culture in
a way that is helpful in understanding MA. In his view, the habitus is a subconscious,
integrative pattern of the patterning of thought that generates a kind of logic operating in
the concepts, in the rules, institutions, and traditions forming various fields of endeavor,
and in guiding the cultural practices within those fields. This discussion begins to
explicate mutualistic argumentation and the need for it. In doing so it tries out Bourdieu’s
notions of habitus, field, and practice in order to explain the character and dynamics of
various forms of MA. Bourdieu’s views are helpful in fixing ideas. Still, they fail to
explain the creative and normative aspects in MA, and they fail to explain how MA can
serve in the development of thinkers. Thus the discussion will suggest how talk of
mutualistic argumentation can improve upon Bourdieu for our purposes.
2. THE CHARACTER OF THOUGHT IN MUTUALISTIC ARGUMENTATION
Mutualistic argumentation does not seek to establish the truth of some claim. But then
how does it proceed? Part of the answer lies in associating MA with one of two
commonly separated forms of thought. Two different sets of intelligent functions are of
interest:


first are those functions that comprise rational thought concerning the facts of
the world. These functions make up conscious, discursive, articulate thought,
perhaps even deliberate reflective thought, that delivers a conceptual,
predicative grasp of singular and general facts about the ways things are or
else of what they matter (often a grasp articulated and ramified in terms of
inferential or evidentiary relationships between expressions of such thought,
perhaps even rational thought ordered into theories or disciplines). We can
call these functions cognitive.
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second are those functions that deliver a wide range of thought constituting
metacognition, that is, a usually subconscious, holistic sense of things
incorporating a) thought concerning where we are, what we are doing, what is
the immediate and felt significance of our situation and the tendencies it
displays (significance at least for who we are and what we are doing), b)
thought of what concerns these realizations in a) bring in their train--what
changes, if any, flow out of those realizations or are called for in what we are
doing, and also c) thought of the way in which these realizations and the
undertakings they lead to fit into or form part of our life as we understand it,
thought continuing and expanding a sort of silent narrative grasp of the place
of our actions in our lives, as we proceed along.
Metacognitive thought is the seemingly automatic flow of attention that
realizes in our interactions and purposeful effort a common grasp or sense of
our personal world, including others and the institutional settings of our
action—a grasp of the context or the gist of things for us, as we are now,
proceeding in the world as a source of change with respect to some matters of
interest. All metacognition while delivering a holistic grasp of things is
fragmentary and so we might speak of different metacognitive frames or
frames of reference for the same person intending portions of that individual's
metacognitive thought occurring in connection with particular activities at
certain moments of the person's life. All metacognition situates us personally,
but it seems that some metacognitive thought situates us in our professional
activities while other metacognition guides us in the everyday and in our
relationships with significant others.

The intently focused thought that constitutes striving for a solution to a question is
one example of what I mean by cognitive thought. The pursuit of the shape of the DNA
molecule by Watson and Crick is one such case in point. (See Watson 1996.) Agonistic
argumentation falls under this large umbrella of cognitive thought as part of a cognitive
struggle over the right or at least the only legitimate answer on some matter. Thus while it
is not to the point to claim that all argumentation in cognitive thought is agonistic, it is
important to note that all agonistic argumentation is part of cognitive thought. Such
argumentation is common in every field of endeavor. Thus:












we litigate;
we offer proofs;
we establish our bona fides;
we reason toward a finding by the coroner's jury;
we conduct a trial to determine the guilt of someone accused of a crime;
we conduct an inquiry into the causes of a plane accident;
we present evidence for a theory such as that of specific descent arising out of
evolution;
we debate, seeking to win;
we plight our troth;
we complete contracts;
the umpire or tennis judge makes a ruling;
3
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we challenge the ruling;
we identify foods that are healthy or not;
we screen drugs for effectiveness in controlled trials;
we diagnose disease and consider differential diagnoses;
we agree to meet; and so on.

Other exchanges of reasons work mutually, serving shared ends. Reaching the
understanding supporting joint planning, mutual adjustments of common understanding,
of relations or of patterns of interaction, all might serve multiple stakeholders as
circumstances change. Out of such mutualistic argumentation emerges a common sense
of salient problems, their nuances, the difficulties they pose in our lives, possible
approaches and the relation of all of these to our relevant personal sense of things.
Mutualistic argumentation concludes not in a finding or a determination of truth but in a
cluster of inseparably interrelated: attitudes; expectations; sensibilities; beliefs; stances;
curiosities; feelings; memories; fears or cautions; limitations of credence, empathy,
patience, perseverance; and so on. Such a cluster works in our life precisely as a
metacognitive framework situating, informing and guiding us in areas of concern and
activity.
Some judgments mark the changes brought on by MA. They place us in such
complex mental constellations of attention and responsiveness. For example, judging that
we are lost but seem to be in a certain vicinity indicated on a topographical map situates
us in the way in question bringing to bear in the situation a number of fears, possible
strategies, cautions, and so on. Judging that our employer is a racist can have the same
degree of impact. In a job it can change the look and feel of virtually everything we do.
Or judging that our place is with a sick or vulnerable relative can have the same sort of
life changing upshot, inverting a number of priorities and changing, accordingly, feelings,
expectations and so on.
Judging with such a life changing impact does not apply a predicate or classify or
subsume some event, policy, practice or person under a concept or category. Rather it
registers our integration and clarification of a common vision of the past and pending
courses of one’s life as lived with others. Thus it marks the new situation of those
engaged in the argumentation, in the world, ready to understand, believe and act in accord
with some common sense of things. Those so engaged reach a counterpoise of tensions
they bring to the situation in the service of readying themselves to share a common
presence and readiness to respond in such as the situation at hand. Participants in MA do
not lose their individuality. That continues as part of the presence of each. But if MA is
successful it will bring participants together into a common metacognitive frame that
holds at bay, with more or less stability, their potentially conflicting tendencies and
sensibilities.
Instances of such argumentation or its registration in judgment:



raise solidarity on some matter;
clarify and challenge the thinking of a dominant group or its culture in so far
as this thinking blocks in oppressed individuals metacognitve thought
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concerning what is inauthentic, unfair, unjust, inappropriate, alienating,
anomic; repressive, rights infringing dysfunctional and on;
articulate the personal gist of my or another's situation by marshalling
personal reasons for seeing things or evaluating them as we do;
facilitate the search for a common set of standards or rules for guidance in
some field of activity;
bring us around to shared views or practices;
bring us to a common sense of things or a consensus;
allay fear;
construct or retrieve memories;
drive home the full implications of some decision, development or policy;
exercise or assert authority, claiming a place in a community of thinkers or
agents, thus also garnering the recognition that authorizes us to act as
responsible agents;
bring us to a vindication of norms or rules or outlooks (See Taylor 1961, pp.
125-150);
bring us to jointly recognize someone as a member of a group; engage us in
holding someone to account;
engage us in mediation; and so on.

Mutualistic argumentation intends no winner or loser in the presentation of what
are taken as reasons; there is no correct or incorrect outcome in terms of a claim or
conclusion or finding, only better and worse considered, and more or less well-integrated
metacognitive frames that will guide us in apt concerted responses and advances.
3. INTERACTIONS OF AGONISTIC COGNITIVE THOUGHT AND MUTUALISTIC
METACOGNITIVE THOUGHT
That said, it is important to emphasize that what I am calling cognitive thought and
metacognition are not completely separate and independent. These two forms of thought
typically (unless we are distracted) are interwoven and richly influence each other.
One form of such interaction is found in our speaking of the uptake of our
rational beliefs and decisions, especially in a context of practical or normative discourse.
(See Mill 1957, pp. 44-51.) The uptake of normative claims amounts to internalizing,
taking to heart, or accepting into our sense of things some form of cognitive thought.
Such internalization amounts to bringing to bear on our metacognitive framework, our
rational grasp of the facts or of the specific way of things in some matter. In doing so we
inform, with pertinent knowledge, our salienced personal integration of an overall sense
of things regarding some matter. To be sure, in this process we put our rational grasp of
the facts into the larger contexts of our lives and make this knowledge ready to influence
action and assessment in the moment or in the future. In doing so, we ground that
cognitive thought in our expanding sense of things perhaps making it fully accepted and
even commonplace. Nevertheless, in doing so we bring our cognitive thought into our
personal, practical, or professional presence of action and understanding, perhaps
expanding and conceptually informing our metacognitive functions of thought,
sometimes even improving the (metacognitive) views and tendencies of recognition our
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conduct expresses, and, sometimes profoundly challenging our metacognitive frame. In
this way, our cognitive thought can come to limit our general sense of things and of
where we fit into them. For example, minority children are still often exposed to claims
that challenge their self-confidence and even their sense of self-worth giving them a view
of their person and prospects that diminishes them in their own eyes and is often
reinforced by the children themselves. Their MCF is limited so that it does not alert them
to opportunities or sources of assistance and does not give them the sensibilities of one
who is developing into a full-fledged member of society able, for example, to expect
equality of opportunity, openness supporting social mobility, and some reasonable return
for their effort. Cognitive thought here illegitimately limits the scope, vision or responses
of our metacognitive frame through bigotry, bias, or ignorance, disabling us from
bringing to articulate thought our true feelings, and aspirations. And this constitutes a
significant threat from cognitive thought to fully functional metacognitive thought. This
danger would seem to call for a certain amount of autonomy for the personal integration
of impressions, feelings, concepts, sensibilities and the rest that give us our holistic
metacognitive sense of things.
Similarly, we speak of bringing our feelings, values, our sensibilities, our sense of
things and the weight of our most deeply held convictions to bear upon our rational
thought as we seek to use our understanding, normative inclinations, doxa and other
aspects of our metacognitve frame as correctives of our cognitive thought. For example, it
was arguably outrage, indignation and a wholly different sense of a well-ordered society
that led to the various portions of the civil rights acts passed in the United States. It is
arguably the metacognitive frame of the gay community and the impact of that upon
traditional belief and a very different MCF that has led to the struggles over marriage
laws in the U.S. It goes without saying that questions of the legitimacy of abortion, of
euthanasia or assisted suicide arise out of a different sense of things, no matter their
rationalization in public discourse and legal pleading. Our different understandings of the
social world have challenged long standing patterns of cognitive thought. In bringing
such challenges we have clarified and checked against our metacognitive sense of things
the practical implications of holding this or that set of beliefs or of conducting a form of
inquiry in a certain way.
Even science does not escape here. It is arguably a different sense of the
significance of traditional or small scale agriculture, of the lives dependent upon it and of
the world of experience surrounding it that have led to political to epistemic protests
against the large industrial scale of agriculture and the predominance of research serving
it as opposed to small scale personal agriculture. Everything from the profits wrought
through removal and development of indigenous plants, to the personal agriculture lost to
the mass planting of export crops, to the patenting of animal genetic codes has challenged
the sense of the world of many observers and stakeholders. (For example, see Lacey
1999, 2005.) Here critics have sought to hold scientific research suited to large scale
industrial agriculture accountable to the social commitments implicit in those research
agendas.
Further we might object to a set of modern concepts attuned to colonialism, on the
basis of a metacognitive frame indigenous to the people who are most vulnerable to the
application of those concepts. For example, some first peoples of the Americas objected
to concepts of land ownership and sale on the basis of a metacognitive frame within
which ownership and private property rights did not make sense when applied to land or
6
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to the animals living wild upon it. But if we succeed, and our metacognitive frame holds
up against the weight of the economic and political forces supporting socially destructive
farming systems or nonsensical conceptual sets, then, some would say, progress has been
thwarted. For example, Galileo was asked to teach the Copernican system only as theory,
because it was felt to be heretical in the MCF of the Inquisitors of the Catholic Church. In
this case, most would say that the sense of the world exercised by the Inquisitors should
not have prevailed. Here it could be said that bias and lack of accountability of a MCF to
critical analysis did retard the progress of thought in illegitimate ways. The authority that
an MCF might exercise in challenging cognitive thought threatens a dominance of
conservatism or even oppression (as in the case of Galileo and the new science)
concealing confusion or ignorance.
Thus influence does run in both directions between cognitive thought presented in
agonistic argumentation and metacognition furthered in mutualistic argument. This
allows both for complementarities between cognition and metacognition and for conflicts
that are illegitimately detrimental to both forms of thought. This complicates the question
of what are legitimate influences crossing between these forms. What is clear however is
that each could not function without the other.
Cognitive functions of thought acutely focused as they are on particular questions
or research agendas could not function without a metacognitive frame determining the
context by defining what is proper research procedure, what are proper sources of
information, what are possibly plausible leads to follow up, and what are not, what
information or what eventualities in the research are relevant and what are not, which are
elegantly posed research questions and which are not, and so on. At the same time, there
are metacognitive contexts or frames that seem to serve us personally in everyday affairs
in the face of moral and prudential dangers and opportunities. But these are not a one size
fits all. They are personal.
Further, there seems to be no sense in speaking of a metacognitive frame
independently of every acute focus on some cognitive question. Metacognitive frames in
serve sets of problems with a wider or narrower but always identifiable and particular
focus. An ecologist would likely be out of place, clueless, have no sense of what is going
on or how to participate in research in engineering and physics devoted to understanding
and controlling the properties of thin films. There is no general scientific metacognitive
frame, though there is the MCF that Watson and Crick took in pursuing the DNA
molecular skeletal form after they became aware of an error in the work of their
competitor Linus Pauling. (See Watson 1996) There is some standardization of the
sensibilities, beliefs, attitudes, expectations, commitments and the rest that make up the
metacognitive frames of scientists in various fields. That is what allowed Snow to speak
of the culture of physicists. And standardization of many functional elements of the MCF
(for example, forms of producing and consuming food and fiber, forms of property
ownership and transfer, and conceptualizations of lines of descent) shared by groups of
people that live in regular contact make it possible for us to speak of a shared culture.
4. SELECTED EXAMPLES OF METACOGNITIVE THOUGHT IN MUTUALISTIC
ARGUMENTATION
Thus far we have discussed mutualistic argumentation in terms of its contrasts with
agonistic argumentation. Beyond this we need some extended examples, and we need an
7
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understanding of the dynamics of mutualistic argumentation. The following appears in
the April, 2009 issue of Scientific American (Dobbs 2009, pp. 64-69).
When a soldier comes home, he must try to reconcile his war experiences with the person he was
beforehand and the society and family he returns to. He must engage in what psychologist Rachel
Yehuda, who researches PTSD at the Bronx VA Hospital, calls “recontextualization”—the process
of integrating trauma into normal experience. It is what we all do, on various scales, when we
suffer breakups, job losses or the deaths of loved ones. Initially the event seems an impossible
aberration. Then slowly we accept the trauma as part of the complex context that is life. (Dobbs
2009, 68)

Dobbs goes on to present evidence that PTSD is greatly over-diagnosed. He
suggests that this excessive rate of diagnosis, and our readiness to accept a high incidence
of PTSD is a failure of our society to “contextualize and accept our own collective
aggression.” (Dobbs 2009, 69) The suggestion here is that United States society needs to
see the need to re-integrate its understanding of the costs of war and adopt a different
“mind-set” or metacognitive frame in which there is a lower level of readiness to pass off
difficulties in dealing with the horrors of war or to diagnose difficulties in readjustment
of returning soldiers as occurrences of PTSD. This would involve a re-integration of our
sensibilities, beliefs, attitudes, expectations and response tendencies so that PTSD is not
so easily seen in the ambiguous symptomology of PTSD and similar appearing troubles.
We need a new updated sense of the forms of the psychological damages of combat or a
new “gist perception” of these damages in returning soldiers. (The language of “gist
perception” is due to Koch 2004.) The SA article does not argue that this is the correct
course of action, though it does suggest how present statistics might hide many false
positives. Rather the argument is that there is now disturbing evidence of false positives,
false consciousness (what Bourdieu would call mis-recognition Bourdieu 1990) and this
appears to a growing number of experts to call for a reassessment and re-integration of
our views of the incidence of PTSD and a review of the official definition of the disorder.
Here we have a call for reconsideration if not revision of our standard metacognitive
framing of the diagnosis and treatment of PTSD. This disturbance and its accompanying
cognitive dissonance calls for a new grasp of the landscape. The re-integrative work
could re-order the priorities, efforts, expectations and attitudes of health care providers,
bringing them toward that new grasp of the situation. It will develop a more nuanced
sensitivity toward the needs presented in the situations of many returning soldiers, and
the opportunities to meet these needs. It also would contain motivation to follow through
on those opportunities.
Thus mutualistic argumentation might proceed by pointing out and discussing the
failures of an internalized or embedded understanding of ailments and treatment
possibilities. In the same way we might we might come to see the need for those harmed
by an oppressive régime to have a voice in some proceedings such as a truth and
reconciliation committee so that their victimization becomes clear and recognized as
criminal. Narratives of some victims or reports of them might resonate with aspects of
our metacognitive frame concerned with decency and justice. This might lead us to
discomfort with the present means victims have of gaining justice. And this disturbance
might open us to understanding the utility of something like a truth and reconciliation
committee. We are not brought to a conclusion of the justice of such a proceedings.
Rather we are given the occasion to better inform our feelings and thinking about the
8
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matter and to form a clear sensitivity toward the denial of such proceedings to victims.
What would an argument look like that has this result? Examples abound in the narratives
of victims of force and refugees fleeing such force. (See Hayner 2002, pp. 133-153) For
example a composite true to many firsthand accounts is the following:
The previous dictatorship/rebel government abducted several members of my family, torturing
them in many ways including rape; and then killing some. They forced me into their service as
part of their combat personnel. I was 12 at the time. Along with others, I was drugged, beaten and
threatened with death if I did not do their bidding. Eventually I came to be a good soldier for them
committing unspeakable acts. This is a dominant part of my thinking even today; my guilt and
shame for doing these things torment me and render me unable to work or even be around people
some days. I wake in fear and horror in the middle of the night, most nights. Our family lost our
lands and houses and all our belongings, such as they were. The government during the war denied
that we had any holdings before the war and destroyed records of our lands. But tribal records tell
a different story and offer a different perspective. This forms the backdrop of any of my activities
today. I cannot return to my village and move on in my life in these circumstances. Nothing
matters except what has happened to me and to my family. Ordinary matters of work and
friendship and place are all trivial, insignificant. This is my life, my devastation, my present and
future as things are now. This is what I bring to the reconstruction and recovery of my country.
How should I go forward from here—who am I, what have I become and what can I offer?
Nothing.

What this imagined commentary suggests is the need to re-construct the MCF of
those interacting with this person so as to recognize what has happened. The first thing
the country needs to do is to re-construct the dominant MCF of all involved so as to
accord proper respect to the victim and to reintegrate its gist of the situation in the
country in the aftermath of the war incorporating the concerns of this victim and others
suffering in similar ways. The justice system might be expected to act to secure official
recognition of what happened. Those in a position to provide or organize health care
services might shift to a post-war recovery mode of thinking in which the plight of this
and other victims would be understood, significant and prominent in considerations of
what services to fund and how to deliver them. No particular policy or plan comes of this
thinking. It is not an argument of an agonistic sort to the conclusion that this person
deserves reparations or justice in the criminal courts or some other particular treatment.
The argument is a disturbance to the dominant metacognitive framework (that of the
authorities and bureaucrats and local officials) so that its attention turns toward such
victims as well as other groups representing business or law enforcement. It is the
presentation of reasons in the form of reports that shock, and bring to a stop ordinary
concerns and complacencies with the ways in which things are done in and by the
government and populace. It is the presentation of reasons for a new integration of views
and concerns, an argument in effect urging a new metacognitive framework in force for
politics and nation building.
This is, after all, what is so shocking about the AIG bonuses; is it not? This is
what the upper management just is not getting, not understanding. They do not see that
the social framework within which they were tolerated or even applauded is gone, calling
for an adjustment of their attitudes, expectations, and perceptions. This is not an inference
from evidence so much as an interruption or a perturbation of present metacognitive
attention. Only the re-integration and reformation of the managers' MCF will deal fully
and properly with the changes in the times. The conclusion is a disturbance that when

9

CHARLES V. BLATZ
they work though it individually and as a group they will come to approach things
differently in their sensitivities and priorities as well as their inhibitions. Our sense of
things changes. What comes of it is a reintegration of our sense of things, of our
understanding of the gist of the situation and along with this a change in a number of
attitudes, expectations, tendencies to respond in positive or negative ways to events, and
with these, changes in a number of conceptualizations and beliefs.
Consider two more examples illustrating the nuanced ways mutualistic
argumentation can lead to a change in MCF. The novel Snow Falling On Cedars (see
Guterson, 1995) tells a story of cross-cultural, youthful love that went unconsummated.
The boy, now grown to manhood in a war that took one of his arms, returns home to take
over the newspaper business belonging to his father. Still bitter about his rejection he is
approached by the girl, herself returned from internment during the war. The woman's
husband has been accused of murder over a land deal that went bad years ago. The
situation is charged with the anti-Japanese sentiment in the general consciousness of the
fishing village where the novel is set. As the trial wears on, the reporter, now heir to his
father's paper, comes to investigate an aspect of the circumstances. He learns that the
accused is not guilty yet fails to share the evidence. At the eleventh hour, after hearing
the closing statement of the defense referring to the prejudice in the area, the reporter
comes into the new community emerging around moving past prejudice and divisive
histories, and saves the day by revealing what he has learned, thus clearing the accused
while making clear the death was accidental. There was no single thread of evidence or
argument that proved the reporter needed to open himself into the post-prejudice
community. No single event made him do this: not the moving closing statement, not his
father's death, not the appeal of his former girlfriend, not even her good will in spite of
the reporter's hostility. But these events and perhaps the precipitating force of aspects of
the closing statement provided a disturbance to his hurt, his reluctance to let go of Hatsue,
and his own prejudice. The MCF supporting these aspects of his presence was inadequate
somehow. The reporter came to reintegrate his metacognitive frame. This took him to a
different space of agency and association, a place beyond the Japanese prejudice, an
emerging community he helped to found in which the prejudice and his reluctance to
reveal the truth had no place. This redemptive re-integration arose from the mutualistic
argument of the reporter’s recall of his interactions with his love, the example of his
father, and the defense’s closing statement. Write these up and there is nothing like a
standard argument. But nonetheless together these are in Mill's words again,
“considerations capable of determining the intellect.” (Mill 1957, p. 7) In this case the
intellect was that of the reporter’s metacognitive frame or perspective. (For a detailed
discussion of this sort of case of a community building mutualistic argument in the midst
of cultural change, see Bhabha 1994, especially pp. 330-331 and 335. Bhabha however
would say that this is a context of agonistic struggle, and perhaps also of agonistic
argument.)
One final example shows how mutualistic argumentation leads to a revision of a
metacognitive framework. In this case what occurs leads a person to himself, bringing
about that change without the support of moving into a community populated by kindred
spirits. The protagonist of The Things That They Carried (O'Brien 1998) runs away from
his home on the eve of his being drafted into service in the Vietnam War. He ends up in a
fishing camp run by a kindly but irascible grandfather figure. A friendship grows in
which the old man pointedly never questions the run away on why he is there. The camp
10
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is in upper Michigan, just a short ways across water from Canada and apparent freedom
for the young man. Tension mounts and the runaway is about to leave to make his way to
safety. The old man urges him to go fishing with him and the pair motor slowly toward
the international border. Close but still a reach from the shore the old man stops the boat.
He turns around and fishes. Tempted, the young man all but leaves, but cannot. He breaks
down in tears and recognizes that he must go back and take part in the combat, even
though he really does not understand why. He feels the imagined pressures from his
family and those in his small home town. He feels the pressures from his friends who
have gone. He feels his fear. But none of this seems compelling. He has changed his mind
but not really decided to go back. He just sees this as the course he will follow. No
agonistic arguments to the effect that patriotism demands it would move him. No
collection of arguments from duty to country or family or anyone else would sustain him
on the drive home, through boot camp and the rest. He has been disturbed by all of this
perhaps, but he is convinced by none of it. Rather, in a way left mysterious, the young
man travels to the limits of his present, escapist mental set, and finds that he cannot
understand escape and life after that. His metacognitive frame that took him this far is
overturned in favor of attitudes, expectations, feelings, and the rest that give him the
mental set of one who is going to war. And he did.
Whatever the reader might come to think of the young man for his half-hearted or
empty-hearted uptake of the option of fighting, his sense of things did change. At the
moment on the lake when he sat back down in the boat he had opened himself to that
reality as well as its dangers and horrors. All of the considerations of his history, his
friendship with the boatman, his familial ties, and the rest disturbed him and interrupted
his escape. All of this, in some mysterious way, apparently not by arguments consisting
of premises and not by someone convincing him of some truth, occasioned his reintegration or reorganization of his metacognitive frame, that set of attitudes, expectations
and the rest that gave him the sense of the world and his place in it. But how, more
particularly, does this work?
5. OBSERVATIONS ON THE DYNAMICS OF MUTUALISTIC ARGUMENTATION
Pierre Bourdieu offers an account of the workings of culture that is suggestive for what I
am calling mutualistic argumentation. The pivotal concept in this view is that of habitus.
Bourdieu was interested in accounting for agency in social settings in a way that is
neither mechanistic nor reliant upon free decisions by the agent. Each of us has several
constraints upon us which, to Bourdieu, do not remove our self-control. There are
biological limitations, for example sex. There are limitations of class and of culture, and
within these last two limits imposed by our position in our class and by the roles we take
as an expression of our culture. Being raised in the world mapped by these limitations, we
internalize them and not only act them out or express them in our ongoing behavior, but
we also act so as to sustain the constraints of these limitations; we act so as to continue
their influence. Still Bourdieu saw this as offering all the “free production” that we, given
who we are, are up to. (See Bourdieu 1990, p. 54) The habitus is that pattern of patterning
of our thoughts, our perceptions and our actions that ensures that our agency expresses or
recapitulates and then ensures the continuation of those forms of behavior and the social
conditions into which we grew. At the same time, this system ensures that among
members of the same social groups, individuals will act and perceive in concert.
11

CHARLES V. BLATZ

Through the economic and social necessity that they bring to bear on the relatively autonomous
world of the domestic economy and family relations, or more precisely, through the specifically
familial manifestations of this external necessity (forms of the division of labour between the
sexes, household objects, modes of consumption, parent-child relations, etc.), the structures
characterizing a determinate class of conditions of existence produce the structures of the habitus,
which in their turn are the basis of the perception and appreciation of all subsequent experiences.
[...] Overriding the spurious opposition between the forces inscribed in an earlier state of
the system, outside the body, and the internal forces arising instantaneously as motivations
springing from free will, the internal dispositions—the internalization of externality—enable the
external forces to exert themselves, but in accordance with the specific logic of the organism in
which they are incorporated, i.e. in a durable, systematic, and non-mechanical way. As an acquired
system of generative schemes, the habitus makes possible the free production of all the thoughts,
perceptions and actions inherent in the particular conditions of its production—and only those. [...]
Because the habitus is an infinite capacity for generating products—thoughts, perceptions,
expressions and actions—whose limits are set by the historically and socially situated conditions
of its production, the conditioned and conditional freedom it provides is as remote from creation of
unpredictable novelty as it is from simple mechanical reproduction of the original conditioning.
(Bourdieu 1990, pp. 54-55)

The habitus then generates restrictions on thought, perception and appreciation. In
doing so, it restricts behavior to patterns apt to and familiar to members of the culture and
class of the agent. There is still spontaneity in so far as individual histories will vary
enough to personalize their understanding and actions. Fields of agency are structured by
rules, conventions, and institutions. These limit what is permitted and what can even
count as behavior of certain sorts. As we become adept at navigating these limitations we
gain a sense of the field and of the game that is played there. Moves become second
nature and anticipate those of others allowing us to coordinate our actions. Such
knowledge is not only internalized in accord with the restrictions of the habitus we live
out, but also it comes to be bodily in character in that we express it in action
unconsciously and without effort. Finally, Bourdieu insists that early experience has the
greatest impact on our habitus and the practices it generates. This is so because our
agency is characteristically conservative and seeks to perpetuate influences of our
experiences and situation.
Bourdieu's notions of an habitus and its formation have considerable interest for
seeking to understand the formation and workings of metacognitive frames. Both
influence what we attend to and then what we perceive as well as what we appreciate.
The habitus seems not so complex and then not to allow for understandings as nuanced or
responses as intricate as those emanating from a metacognitive frame. The metacognitive
frame we bring to a situation incorporates emotions, feelings, attitudes, past stances,
present fears, hopes, agendas as well as a holistic grasp of the character of the situation,
its significance to us, and then the future direction of action we are inclined to undertake
in response to the situation. The habitus seems wooden by comparison.
The metacognitive frame often operates unconsciously, and in any event it is not
something we can ever fully recover to consciousness. Still it is something aspects of
which we become aware of as influencing us, and which we even (successfully) set out to
change. We can eliminate a bias, or tendency to respond in less than productive ways to
the actions of others, for example. We can work on becoming more open and able to meet
others in their own persons, not in the roles they play or as members of groups they
belong to. Bourdieu goes out of his way to make clear why the habitus might find
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idiosyncratic expressions but is unlikely to be open to reform or replacement as is the
metacognitive frame.
Further, the metacognitive frame affords us only one important form of attention
that of the context of our thinking or the gist perception of the situation pertinent to
conducting acutely focused inquiry in cognitive thought. Focal attention or the acute
focus of cognitive thought is different from but depends upon metacognitive thought. The
impression Bourdieu gives is that of agency with no separation between these two forms
of attention and two forms of thought. The conditioning we receive in being raised in a
class and culture system and to which we owe a life sentence is fully suitable to the
objectivism of sociology, but not to understanding how distractions and failures of
commonality between people's metacognitive frames can lead to failures of coordination
or concerted effort as well as can class or cultural differences. There are large issues afoot
here of course.
The metacognitive frame readies us to perceive and appreciate, as well as saves us
from many distractions. In addition it allows for change of the sorts indicated in this
discussion's various examples. This allowance opens not only possibilities of nuances of
understanding and self-corrective changes that seem to get no purchase in Bourdieu’s
view, but also the malleability of metacognitive frames allows for the application of
lessons of good thinking to our general sense of things pertinent to acutely focused
cognitive thought. As should be clear, we can take to heart cautions about fallacies,
informal or formal, we can hone our sense of what is relevant to various inquiries and
arguments, we can internalize scruples of good observation and of clarity. We can take on
the culture of the norms and best practices of good thinking. All of these would involve
work on the metacognitive frame we bring to an inquiry. But there seems to be no other
form or platform of thought where we might acquire and bring to bear the culture of good
thinking. There is no place at all for that in Bourdieu's habitus. But then there would be
no clear use for that either.
6. CONCLUSION
Mutualistic argumentation can lead us to re-integrate our sense of ourselves and our sense
of things pertinent to our thinking about various forms or sets of problems. This is not
accomplished by a representation of evidentiary relationships or a display of premises
and conclusions as in argumentation undertaken to establish the truth or correctness of
some claim. And yet, as J.S. Mill might suggest, mutualistic argumentation provides
considerations sufficient to the task. The process is not inference, but re-integration of the
shared gist of relevant matters. The work of the argument is to disturb our current way of
attending to the general sense of our activities at the time, including the activity of
conducting specific inquiries. Mutualistic argumentation is successful in case that
disturbance is rich enough in ways that occasion changes in that way of attending. Not all
such arguments will be, even though it was possible for them to have been--possible in a
sense clear to rhetoricians. Such improvements would be noted in terms of our
metacognitive attention becoming more functional by virtue of becoming more open or
inclusive, more clarifying, more sensitive, and more responsive in ways important within
our sense of things. While this discussion only sketches its character, it perhaps makes
clear the need to consider further mutualistic argumentation. Much needs to be done to
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understand its operations and its malleability before we begin to understand it as home
for the critical culture of good thinking.
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